

CIACO NID 81 [REDACTED]

October 31, 1981

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR-POLAND: The View From Moscow

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*The Soviet leadership probably derives some satisfaction from recent developments in Poland and sees more possibilities for influencing events by nonmilitary means than it did six months ago. Nonetheless, by continuing to push the regime in Warsaw to take tougher measures, the Soviets are taking a calculated risk of having to intervene should any ensuing confrontation get out of hand.* [REDACTED]

The Soviets probably were satisfied by the outcome of Solidarity's recent congress. Although it began on a radical note with an "appeal" to East European workers, its second session was more restrained. The congress also revealed the depth of divisions within the union. [REDACTED]

Party leader Kania's replacement by Prime Minister Jaruzelski was another development that met Soviet approval. Jaruzelski probably is not Moscow's first choice to lead Poland, but he conveys an image of strength and appeals to a fairly broad spectrum of party opinion. The Soviets' qualified approval will fade quickly if Jaruzelski proves less resolute than they believe necessary. [REDACTED]

Efforts To Gain Influence

At the same time that the Soviets have been putting pressure on the Polish leadership to restore party cohesion and suppress union militancy, they also have sought to foster moderation on Solidarity's part. Using broader strategy, Moscow probably sees more possibilities for shaping events in Poland by nonmilitary means than it did last spring. [REDACTED]

Since July, Moscow has cultivated contacts with the previously unknown officials elected at the Polish party congress. By now the Soviets are better informed about the new functionaries and are likely to have established influence with some. The Central Committee vote to accept Kania's resignation probably helped to reassure the Soviets that they wield some influence in the party hierarchy. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets also have continued to use their Vatican contacts to seek the Church's help in urging moderation on Solidarity. More recently, they appear to have established direct contact with union moderates, perhaps including Solidarity chief Walesa. [REDACTED]

In addition, Moscow is using the threat of economic sanctions to quash anti-Soviet activity. A Soviet economic delegation reportedly indicated in September that the USSR might insist upon balanced bilateral trade, in effect depriving Poland of essential energy and raw material imports. [REDACTED]

The Soviets probably would not actually carry out such a threat, because it could precipitate massive disorder and force Moscow to intervene militarily. Nonetheless, some Polish officials and members of Solidarity apparently believe that the economic threat has replaced military intervention as Moscow's ultimate weapon. [REDACTED]

#### Outlook

The Soviets probably believe that their best hope for a nonmilitary solution lies in convincing the Polish public that union militants are to blame for deteriorating economic conditions and that Poland's well-being depends on close relations with the USSR. For now, Moscow will use the means of influence available to it to encourage the steady strengthening of party and government authority and the political neutralization of Solidarity. The Soviets probably will allow Jaruzelski considerable room to maneuver, so long as he works toward a reassertion of party control. [REDACTED]

Nonetheless, the Soviets will press Jaruzelski to respond firmly to any challenge from Solidarity. They will be taking a calculated risk that the Polish regime will be able to handle any disturbances resulting from the confrontation and also be signaling their willingness to intervene themselves should the regime lose control. [REDACTED]